The Model Middle Power

The Model Middle Power

What South Korea Gets Right About Geopolitics

Andrew Yeo

November 18, 2026

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and his wife Kim Hea Kyung waving the country’s flag in Seoul, August 2025
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and his wife Kim Hea Kyung waving the country’s flag in Seoul, August 2025 Ahn Young-joon / Reuters

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  • In the ten months since Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave his widely discussed speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the question of whether, and how, the world’s middle powers can help rebuild a broken international order has become increasingly urgent. In his remarks, Carney stressed that although the old U.S.-led alliance system was collapsing, middle powers—states that do not have the ability to reshape global politics but that still possess substantial might—were well positioned to pick up the slack. But to do so, Carney argued, they would need to build up their “strength at home” and “act together” to harness their collective power, even in the absence of backing from the world’s hegemon.

    Although the Canadian prime minister’s bold vision was widely applauded, some experts thought his agenda was overly ambitious. They noted, correctly, that it would be very difficult for middle powers to build a grand alliance composed of countries as diverse as Brazil, Canada, South Africa, and Turkey. “The path to unity among middle powers is fraught because this group includes rich and poor countries, as well as small and large ones,” wrote the economist Edwar Prasad in February. Carney, however, is right that middle powers have an opportunity to thrive going forward. Even when aligning with great powers, these countries can still exercise greater autonomy by developing national capacity and diversifying external partnerships.

    South Korea offers a prime example of this flexible approach. For decades, Seoul has pursued a middle-power strategy centered on building domestic strength and forging partnerships with democracies everywhere while deepening its alliance with Washington. South Korea has been adaptable, recalibrating its security alignments, economic strategies, and diplomatic roles as regional and global conditions require. This has enabled a country smaller in size than most of the world’s states to punch far above its weight, exercising substantial influence in Asia and beyond.

    Not every government can Seoul’s path, and South Korea’s strategy has its limits. As Seoul itself acknowledges, middle powers cannot escape great-power competition. But the country has begun to show what middle powers can accomplish when they leverage their partnerships and their own strength to protect their interests and deter larger threats. And by maintaining and even building its ties to the United States while asserting greater autonomy, South Korea has proven that middle powers can strengthen themselves without building whole new networks—contrary to Carney’s suggestion.

    WHALE WATCHING

    According to classic international relations theory, grand strategy is the exclusive provenance of great powers. The United States’s effort to contain the Soviet Union during the Cold War is a paradigmatic example; China’s pursuit of global economic primacy is another. Middle powers, by contrast, have little say in such strategies. Instead, these countries are seen as primarily reactive in their foreign policies, navigating around the decisions of the great powers rather than setting the agenda themselves.

    But recent history suggests that the division between great and middle powers is less clear-cut than has been assumed. In practice, middle powers very much have their own affirmative visions that they pursue in the world. They have the leeway to decide which threats matter most to them, which partnerships to prioritize, and where to invest scarce resources. Japan, concerned with the threat posed by China, has been quietly exercising leadership in the Indo-Pacific by improving its ties with neighbors, increasing investment and aid to the region, and strengthening its own defense capabilities—all while remaining closely allied with the United States. India, worried about China, Pakistan, and growing economic headwinds, has successfully bolstered partnerships with the United States and other democracies but maintained its relationship with Russia.

    Much Japan and India, South Korea is worried about its neighbors. But for Seoul, this is nothing new. South Korean leaders have been concerned with the very thing Carney fretted about in his Davos speech—becoming collateral damage in conflicts between great powers— since at least the late nineteenth century, when it was caught between China, Japan, and Russia. The country has a well-known proverb, “When whales fight, the shrimp’s back is broken,” that captures the sentiment that great-power feuds can harm countries caught in the middle.

    Seoul has no plans to abandon the United States, at least in the near future.

    To safeguard against this threat, Seoul has long sought to increase its self-reliance through industrial policy. The country transited from light to heavy export industries in the 1970s, turning it into a major player in the chemical, steel, and shipbuilding sectors. State investments helped it become a major global producer of batteries and semiconductors in the present era. South Korea takes great pride in what historians call “the miracle on the Han”—or the country’s rapid rise from a war-torn and impoverished state to a rich one during the late twentieth century. They now use the state’s wealth to promote public goods globally, contributing to international development, global health, climate policy, and multilateral bodies.

    Seoul has also built up a formidable military, one that experts consistently rank as among the strongest in the world. Today, the country is considering developing a nuclear arsenal for self-defense, even though South Korea officially remains under Washington’s nuclear umbrella. The state has simultaneously used its armed prowess to deepen relations with U.S. allies. Seoul, for example, has inked multibillion-dollar arms deals with European buyers, making it a key partner in rebuilding NATO’s industrial capacity. In 2025, it was the second largest supplier of weapons to European NATO members (after the United States). South Korea has also forged defense partnerships in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, widening Seoul’s options and reducing its dependence on any single market. South Korea, in other words, has been able to convert its economic resources and bureaucratic capabilities into greater influence by expanding its partnerships, strengthening its voice in international bodies, and helping shape global rules and norms.

    But even as it charts its own path, Seoul has no plans to abandon the United States, at least in the near future. In fact, the sanctity of the U.S.-South Korean relationship is a significant historical Korean narrative. Many South Koreans see the alliance as a bond inked in blood, thanks to the sacrifice both countries made during the Korean War, when they worked to stop North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, from overrunning the south. Most South Koreans correctly believe that the continued U.S. military presence in the country—currently, 28,500 American troops are stationed on the peninsula—has played a major part in deterring North Korean aggression over the past seven decades.

    BEST OF BOTH WORLDS

    At first glance, South Korea’s strategy may seem contradictory. On the one hand, the country wants to deepen its cooperation with the United States, on which it still depends for security. But on the other, it seeks greater autonomy.

    Yet these twin goals are not actually at odds. By cultivating ties with Washington, Seoul has gained access to advanced military capabilities and technologies as well as a larger diplomatic platform to expand its regional and global interests. It is in part because of this relationship, for example, that South Korea has had such success at selling weapons to multiple NATO members, including Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Poland, and Romania. (Seoul has also built up a formidable diplomatic apparatus in its own right.) At the same time, South Korea helps make this compact worthwhile for the United States by providing it with valuable technology, including semiconductor chips. Seoul has also partnered with the Washington to help revive the American shipbuilding industry, agreeing to invest $150 billion in the U.S. sector.

    Still, South Korea’s growing push for more independence in its foreign policy does result in some tensions with the United States that cannot easily be resolved. For instance, the current government’s push to give Seoul, not Washington, operational control over both states’ forces on the peninsula in the event of war has been rebuffed by the U.S. military. American commanders instead favor a conditions-based transfer after South Korea has proven it has the capabilities to lead a joint defense, rather than setting a fixed date. The two sides also have not reached a consensus on what role South Korea would play if Taiwan is attacked or blockaded by China.

    Adaptive middle powers can draw on their national narratives to find their strengths.

    Yet so far, Seoul has done an effective job at managing these differences. For example, in his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly accused Washington’s allies, including South Korea, of leeching off the United States and not paying their fair . To extract more from Washington’s partners, Trump has implemented punishing tariffs. In response, South Korea could have been defiant and slapped on retaliatory restrictions, as other U.S. allies did. Instead, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung avoided rebuking the president and worked to meet American demands in ways that heightened the two states’ mutual dependence. For instance, Lee pledged to invest $350 billion in the United States to advance American economic and national security interests, including by purchasing more U.S. military equipment, and to increase South Korean economic support for locally stationed American forces.

    Seoul’s strategy has not been a uniform success. The South Korean economy remains exposed to American and Chinese pressure despite its growth and diversification. North Korea is expanding its nuclear and missile forces and deepening military ties with Russia, creating new security headaches for which Seoul still needs U.S. assistance. The country is politically polarized, resulting in sharp policy shifts that can undermine long-term strategic planning. It also suffers from the lowest birthrate of any country in the world, threatening its tax base and the size of its armed forces. Beyond that, South Korea may not provide the ideal template for every middle power. Not every country in this category has similar economic resources, networks, or ties to the United States.

    But on the whole, South Korea’s grand strategy has been effective, and it thus carries broader lessons. For one, it shows how adaptive middle powers can draw on their respective national narratives to find their strengths and to chart a path forward. Perhaps more important, it is proof positive that middle powers can exercise influence and achieve a measure of autonomy even without working together to build a neutral third pole, as Carney urged. It also illustrates that middle powers can remain firmly allied with the United States while developing their own independent capabilities. South Korea, then, demonstrates that states can reduce their vulnerability and widen their political options.

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