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America’s Hidden Ai Advantage

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America’s Hidden AI Advantage

The United States—Not China—Dominates Diffusion

Jeffrey Ding

November 18, 2026

Humanoid robots in Shenzhen, China, November 2026 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

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  • In the view of most observers, China is winning the race to diffuse artificial intelligence across the economy. Even if the United States has a small lead in frontier AI models, the consensus is that China is better at applying the technology. As Kevin Rudd, former prime minister of Australia and a prominent observer of Chinese politics, declared at a conference in October, China is “miles ahead” in spreading AI “into the real economy.” This fits a familiar narrative about the technological rivalry between the two great powers: the United States innovates while China turns those innovations into practical applications at scale.

    This narrative has become central to discussions of U.S.-Chinese competition in AI. But it doesn’t match reality. After the Chinese startup DeepSeek shocked the world in early 2025 with the announcement of an open-source large language model that rivaled the capabilities of frontier models made by American companies, the international media published breathless reports on how DeepSeek’s model had rapidly spread across state-owned enterprises, hospitals, and provincial and local governments. Months later, however, analysts determined that this adoption was shallow, narrow, and slow; the technology was being used on clunky “all-in-one machines” embedded on isolated hardware units within these institutions, rather than integrated more broadly into the software services they were using. Then, in January 2026,outside observersmarveled at OpenClaw, a new open-source AI agent, as a sign of China’s diffusion advantage. Now, the excitement about these open-source agents has dissipated as security vulnerabilities and inefficiency have limited their uptake.

    It is the United States, not China, that has a decisive lead in AI diffusion. This is because the United States has comparative advantages in both its overall level of economic development and the nature of its growth model. China’sunderdeveloped software market, weak technology transfer mechanisms, and centralized economic systemmake AI diffusion much more challenging. All told, the United States’ advantage in diffusing the technology through the economy is ly to persist for the foreseeable future.

    STOPPING THE SPREAD

    Despite its reputation as a pioneer of digital technology such as cashless payments and messaging apps, China’s overall digitization levels—the extent to which software and other digital tools have penetrated various sectors of the economy—are far lower than those in the United States. American firms are on average more than twice as ly as their Chinese competitors to adopt cloud computing services. And the U.S. enterprise software market, which includes services to manage customer relationships and provide business intelligence, is approximately ten times larger than China’s. According to the 2022 Global Cloud Ecosystem Index, which ranked 76 countries on their access to and usage of cloud services, China sat in the bottom half; the United States, by contrast, ranked 17th, not far behind the top performers, in part because of its dominance of “software as a service” products in which businesses can gain access to enterprise software without needing to install and maintain the programs themselves.

    China’s relatively low penetration of digital services is a barrier to diffusing AI. When small Chinese hospitals tried to adopt DeepSeek, for instance, they lacked information systems that could collect and manage the data necessary to take full advantage of AI models. In these hospitals, which include many small health facilities in rural areas, patient data is still recorded on paper; where digital records do exist, they are often incomplete or vary from hospital to hospital. By contrast, 95 percent of U.S. doctors maintain electronic health record systems in their offices. As a result, U.S. hospitals have more smoothly integrated AI into electronic health records to recommend treatments, predict health risks, and simplify billing.

    China’s underdeveloped cloud and enterprise software ecosystem also explains why the OpenClaw hype did not translate to sustainable diffusion. Open-source tools OpenClaw appeal to hobbyists and individual developers who are keen to experiment and are less sensitive to security issues. But small businesses have been slow to adopt such tools because they prefer reliable, standardized solutions that are easy to implement and update.Small businesses are more ly to rely on cloud-based tools and enterprise software to implement AI upgrades than to try to experiment on their own—two channels that are less robust in China than in the United States.

    IT’S BUSINESS TIME

    The United States also has an advantage over China because of linkages within the science and technology ecosystem that help disseminate advances. Collaboration between universities and businesses is critical to diffusing AI breakthroughs across the entire economy because these connections bring together innovators who can develop new AI products and implementers who can effectively commercialize them.

    In this dimension, the United States is far ahead of China. Americans have long led the world in the publication of articles about AI co-authored by at least one researcher from academia and one researcher from industry. Between 2015 and 2019, U.S. researchers published more than twice as many such articles as their Chinese counterparts. The gap extends beyond AI: across the life sciences and natural sciences, the of publications in the United States that involved both university and industry researchers was also more than double the comparable rate in China. Beijing recognizes this gap: China’s official state news agency ranked weak technical exchanges between industry and academia as one of the five crucial shortcomings of the country’s AI ecosystem.

    Although Chinese policymakers are aware of this challenge and have promoted policies to try to spur collaboration between universities and businesses, especially in AI, it will be difficult to cultivate the requisite trust needed for these two sectors to work together. China’s weak intellectual property protections, for example, discourage universities from pursuing partnerships with industry actors because they fear losing ownership of their inventions. The United States, by contrast, has a tradition of university-industry collaboration. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act,which provides incentives and patent protections that encourage universities to commercialize inventions and license them to the private sector, kick-started decades of collaboration. Without a similar connective tissue to link academic institutions and businesses, Chinese universities are not as equipped to form profitable partnerships with companies. Chinese technical and engineering education is also disconnected from commercial enterprises, meaning that schools do not teach students the specific skills that companies need in their workforces.

    Weak technology transfer mechanisms also undermine one of China’s main strengths in AI diffusion: its massive talent base. Analysis by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation showed that in 2022, China awarded around 50,000 doctoral degrees in science, technology, engineering, and math, compared with only about 34,000 in the United States. Although the sheer quantity of Chinese computer science graduates may eventually help the country adopt AI advances at scale, the quality of that education determines how quickly or effectively education can encourage AI diffusion. If training is divorced from practical applications, graduates will struggle to adapt cutting-edge advances from industry labs into the sectors in which they work. Consider one commonly used standard to measure the baseline quality of AI education: whether a university employs at least one researcher who has published at least one paper ata leading AI conference.According to data from 2023–24, only 38 universities in China met this standard; the United States accounted for 150.

    OUT WITH THE PLAN

    China’s centrally planned approach to AI development is also counterproductive when it comes to diffusion. In 2025, China developed an “AI Plus” action plan that outlines targets for AI adoption over the next decade and released guidelines for government agencies and local officials onhow to put the plan into effect across the country. For many observers, the mere existence of a plan showed that the highest levels of Chinese leadership were committed to spreading AI widely and that China was better positioned to win the AI race than the United States, which lacks any kind of similar diffusion blueprint. Rudd’s claims about China’s edge in AI adoption, for instance, cite Beijing’s ambitious policies and targets for AI diffusion as supporting evidence.

    But centralized approaches such as China’s often impede technology diffusion, especially when the state tries to intervene in domains in which the development trajectory is uncertain. One of the planks of China’s AI Plus plan identifies “global cooperation” as a priority sector for AI adoption. If local governments were to implement the plan as outlined, it would shift resources from areas in which diffusion has been proven to be effective, such as health care, to the undefined space of “global cooperation.” More broadly, Beijing’s favoritism toward state-owned enterprises and its preference for picking national champions often prop up inefficient technologies that would have been weeded out by market-based competition. Other businesses are unly to adopt inefficient technologies, making nonmarket forms of AI development less ly to diffuse widely.

    Counterintuitively, the lack of a clear U.S. policy on AI diffusion is a boon, not a hindrance, to the United States’ attempt to diffuse the technology across the economy. At the height of U.S.-Japanese competition in the 1980s, for instance, when the two countries were racing to train software engineers who could spread computer technology, Japan’s Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture, as it was then known, exercised centralized control over universities. But emerging trends in computer science developed faster than the government could adapt. By concentrating state funds on centers of excellence and imposing one-size-fits-all rules on the computing curriculum, Japan could not match the adaptability of American universities, and the United States surged ahead. Cross-national studies have shown that decentralized science and technology systems are correlated with faster diffusion of new innovations.

    Another historical case with parallels to China, the Soviet Union, further suggests how centralization is antithetical to diffusion. In the twentieth century, the Soviet Union boasted many plans for technology development. Yet its top-down approach, which focused on large-scale engineering projects, undercut market-based instruments that encourage technology diffusion through competition. As a result, although the Soviet Union pioneered new technologies in many areas, including the casting of steel, it fell behind the United States in adopting general-purpose technologies such as computers. A prescient U.S. intelligence report published in 1969 deemed the Soviet Union’s mechanisms for technology diffusion as “much more balky” than those of the United States because of the absence of competitive pressures as well as limited linkages between the R & D system and the broader economy.

    THE MYTH THAT WON’T DIE

    The myth of China’s lead in AI diffusion persists despite clear data showing U.S. advantages. In part, this may be because China’s innovation system has facilitated the widespread adoption of certain visible technologies. In less than 20 years, China has built more than 30,000 miles of high-speed rail, for example, blanketing the country with ultra-fast trains that now reach even the most remote provinces.

    But infrastructure presents a very different challenge than AI does. The centralized pressure that officials can use to effectively develop large-scale infrastructure projects is much less effective for general-purpose technologies AI because it is infeasible to mandate that all small- and medium-size firms, spread across every sector of the economy, adopt artificial intelligence. Those companies would do so only if it made sense from a business perspective, and few have the digital foundations or savvy employees able to harness AI in a way that would help them grow. Moreover, the United States has outbuilt China in the infrastructure most essential to AI development, data centers, in which it retains a ten-to-one edge. In fact, in some cases, the data centers that China has built remain idle because of weak AI demand.

    China’s centrally planned approach to AI development impedes diffusion.

    The misperception that China leads AI diffusion may continue unabated because analysis of the country’s technology ecosystem is overly focused on frontier firms such as ByteDance and DeepSeek and first-tier cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. Yet AI diffusion ultimately rests on whether adoption occurs in medium size companies, small towns, and inland provinces, where it has been extremely limited. Because these settings rarely feature in outside media coverage, analysis of China’s AI diffusion landscape underestimates the difficulty of translating cutting-edge advances from frontier labs and universities in Hangzhou or Shenzhen to, say, a small firm in a county seat in northwestern Qinghai Province.

    Perhaps the simplest explanation is that such a myth is useful, even if ultimately untrue. In some ways, the United States is trumpeting Beijing’s AI diffusion in the way that Chinese “tiger parents” try to motivate their children to work harder by raising the success of “that other family’s kid.” “Look at how well that other family’s kid performed at the piano recital,” they might say, without listening closely to ensure that the notes were exactly right. In great-power rivalry, too, there is a natural tendency to overhype the other side’s capabilities, in part to spur more effort at home.

    But such a “useful” myth can backfire if it pushes the United States to overlook its own advantages or even to mimic China’s more top-downapproach to AI development. By any measure, the United States maintains a comfortable lead in AI diffusion, and China, despite its impressive successes, has serious challenges. Although the narrative of Chinese dominance endures, for now all signs point to a U.S. lead that will remain strong.

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